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I. INTRODUCTION
One out of eight women born today will develop breast cancer in her
lifetime.1 Breast cancer is the second major cause of cancer death for women in
the United States.2 The American Cancer Society estimates that 180,200 women
will be diagnosed with breast cancer and 43,900 women will die of breast cancer
during 1997.3 Women who have been diagnosed with breast cancer often have
to battle more than the disease-they frequently have to battle their insurance
companies for coverage of treatments their insurance companies deem
experimental such as High-Dose Chemotherapy coupled with autologous
bone marrow transplantation [hereinafter HDCT/ABMT]. 4 The Office of
Personnel Management and several state legislatures have responded.
This note focuses on the highly publicized coverage disputes involving
HDCr/ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer to illustrate the problems
inherent in courts judging medical technology and legislatures politicizing
medical technology. The problems exist, however, with respect to every
developing medical technology for which there is no consensus on its safety
and effectiveness. Part II of this note depicts the typical scenario involving a
patient with metastatic breast cancer. Part III outlines the drug approval
process and off-label drug use. Part IV describes HDCT/ABMT treatment and
discusses the lack of consensus regarding its efficacy for the treatment of breast
cancer. Exclusionary provisions in insurance contracts for experimental
treatments are discussed in Part V. Part VI examines how courts have dealt with
coverage disputes. Part VII discusses discrimination claims relative to coverage
denials. Part VIII identifies the Office of Personnel Management's directive and
state legislation that has been enacted or is being considered to address the
reimbursement problem relative to HDCT/ABMT treatment for breast cancer.
Part IX discusses the dangers of politicizing medicine. This note concludes with
recommendations that federal legislation be enacted which sets out a clear
definition of "experimental" medical treatment, a uniform policy on off-label
drug use, and mandates coverage of patient care costs when associated with
an approved clinical cancer trial.
II. TYPICAL SCENARIO
Sarah is a 37-year-old married woman with two young children. Sarah was
diagnosed with breast cancer two years ago. Sarah underwent a lumpectomy
followed by a radical mastectomy and several cycles of conventional chemo-
1AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, INC., CANCER FACTs & FIcuREs - 1997 8 (1997).
2 Id.
3id.
4HDCT/ABMT is discussed in Section IV infra.
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therapy. Last month, Sarah's cancer was found to have recurred, and she was
diagnosed as having metastatic disease.5
Sarah's doctor recommended that she undergo HDCT/ABMT and referred
her to a program at a local hospital. In spite of the lack of scientific data
supporting HDCT/ABMT's effectiveness for metastatic breast cancer, Sarah's
doctor told her that HDCT/ABMT was her best chance for significant
survival.6 As a condition of participation, the program required precertification
by Sarah's insurance company or a substantial payment towards the cost of the
procedure. Sarah's insurance company denied precertification claiming that
HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer is experimental and
thus excluded from coverage.7
Sarah may take one of several courses of action: she can go to court to get a
second opinion on whether HDCT/ABMT is covered under her insurance
policy; she can enroll in a randomized or non-randomized clinical trial with
the possibility that her insurer may not cover the associated clinical care costs;
she can continue with the conventional chemotherapy which she has been
receiving; she can pay for the treatment herself from savings, mortgaging her
home, gifts and/or loans from family members, fund raising, etc.; or she can
accept her impending death and improve the quality of her remaining life by
refusing to continue chemotherapy treatment.8
SMetastatic disease is cancer that has spread beyond the original site. TABER'S
CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY (15 ed. 1985). Cancer is typically classified in terms
of stages of increased severity from Stage I to Stage V. Stage IV breast cancer indicates
that the cancer has metastasized. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp.
586, 588 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1990) (citing THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS & THERAPY 2076
(14th ed. 1982)).
6Cancer patients are extremely vulnerable. Hearings Before the House Committee on
Post Office & Civil Service, Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits, 103d Cong.
140 (1994) (testimony of I. Craig Henderson, M.D.) available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Cngtst File. If a patient's doctor tells her that HDCT/ABMT therapy is her best or only
hope, the patient will likely conclude that she must undergo this treatment, in spite of
the lack of scientific evidence supporting the treatment's efficacy. Id.
7See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993); Nesseim v.
Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993); Clark v. K-Mart Corp., No.
91-3723, 1992 WL 106935 (3d Cir. May 22, 1992); Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1992); Comprecare Ins. Co. v. Snow, No. 92-CV-8087, 1993 WL
330929 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 16, 1993); Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.) Inc.,
823 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1993);Kekis v. Blue Cross & BlueShield of Utica-Watertown,
Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., Inc.,
764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F.
Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991);
Kulakowski v. Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Pirozzi
v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990); Sweeney v. Gerber
Prod. Co. Medical Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989);Tepev. RockyMountain
Hosp. & Med. Serv., 893 P.2d 1323 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
8The most common side effects of chemotherapy are nausea, vomiting, abnormal
decrease of white blood cells, and loss of hair. See D. Greene et al., A Comparison of
1996]
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Ill. THE DRUc APPROVAL PROCESS
Different medical technologies go through different regulatory processes:
prescription drugs go through a rigorous regulatory process, "medical devices
go through a less rigorous process," and procedures go through no regulatory
process at all.9 A new drug may not be marketed unless it has been approved
by the Food and Drug Administration [hereinafter FDA] as safe and effective.10
"Clinical trials by qualified experts are a prerequisite for determination of safety
and effectiveness. 11 Clinical trials are classified into three phases, and research
usually progresses in order from Phase I to Phase 11.12
With respect to cancer studies, Phase I involves initial testing to determine
the relationship between toxicity and dosage.13 Phase I studies usually involve
fifteen to twenty-five patients and are conducted almost exclusively in
specialized research centers.14 In Phase II studies, the new treatment is
generally given to twenty patients with a specific type of tumor to determine
whether the treatment has any observable effect.15 Phase III trials are
randomized clinical trials that compare a standard treatment with a new
treatment.16 Phase III trials require large numbers of patients and are
conducted to confirm and quantify the effectiveness of the treatment.17
Inadequate patient accrual hampers Phase III trials of cancer drugs. 18
The low percentage of enrollment impedes timely completion of many
cancer drug trials, has a negative impact on the cancer cure rate, and exacer-
Patient-Reported Side Effects Among Three Chemotherapy Regimens For Breast Cancer,
CANCER PRACT. 57-62 (jan.-Feb. 1994).
9 Christine Woolsey, Treatment Debate Heats Up; Payers in 'Catch 22' Between Claims
of Discrimination and Ambiguity, Bus. INS., May 15, 1995, at 26.
1OHenry I. Miller & Frank E. Young, The Drug Approval Process at the Food and Drug
Administration; New Biotechnology as a Paradigm of Science-Based Activist Approach, ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 655, 655 (1989).
111d.
12Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661, 671 n.5 (D. Md.
1991).
131d.
14William B. Farrar, Clinical Trials: Access and Reimbursement, 67 CANCER 1779,1779
(1991).
15 Id.
161d. Today, researchers studying a life-threatening illness rarely use placebos, but
instead compare the new treatment against standard therapy. Id.
17 Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 671.
18 American Medical Ass'n Council on Scientific Affairs, Viability of Cancer Clinical
Research: Patient Accrual, Coverage, and Reimbursement, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 254,254
(1991) [hereinafter AMA on Scientific Affairs].
[Vol. 44:67
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol44/iss1/6
"EXPERIMENTAL" MEDICAL TREATMENT
bates the problem of coverage disputes.19 According to the American Cancer
Society, broader participation in clinical trials could raise the cancer cure rate
to 75% by the year 2000 from its present rate of 52%.20 Yet, of the nearly one
million cancer patients diagnosed in the United States each year, less than 3%
are participating in such trials.21 If only 10% of patients with common tumors
enrolled in clinical trials, the current time frame of three to five years for
completion could be cut to one year.22
A. Obstacles To Patient Enrollment In Clinical Trials
Before adequate patient accruals and more timely completion of clinical
trials can be achieved, more physicians must suggest enrollment in clinical
trials to their eligible patients and insurers must cover the costs of participating
in clinical trials. Physicians participating in a major study cited the following
reasons, in descending order of importance, why they are reluctant to enroll
patients in clinical trials:
(1) concern with the doctor-patient relationship (73%); (2) trouble with
informed consent (38%); (3) dislike of open discussions about
uncertainty (23%); (4) conflict within the physician as a clinician and
as a scientist (18%); (5) practical difficulties in trial procedures (9%);
and (V feelings of personal responsibility if treatments are unequal
(8%).
In an effort to boost patient accrual, the National Cancer Institute adopted a
promotional campaign that involved conducting seminars, disseminating
information to national and local news media, and assisting in making
information on clinical trials available to patients and physicians. 24
Insurer's inconsistency in coverage is also hampering patient accrual in
clinical trials.25 Usually the sponsor of a clinical study provides the funds for
the research expenses of the study, e.g. pharmaceuticals, data gathering,
monitoring, quality assurance, special tests, statistical analysis, reporting, etc.26
There is, however, a level of medical care required by a cancer patient indepen-
191d.
20paul Cotton, Treatments of Last Resort?, 17 HARv. HEALTH LETrER 9,9 (1991).
21Farrar, supra note 14, at 1780.
221d.
23AMAon Scientific Affairs, supra note 18, at 255.
24Farrar, supra note 14, at 1780.
25Id. at 1781.
26Michael A. Friedman & Mary S. McCabe, Assigning Care Costs Associated With
Therapeutic Oncology Research: A Modest Proposal, 84 J. NATI CANCER INsT. 760, 760(1992).
1996]
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
dent of enrollment in a clinical trial.27 Until recently, "[elither through tacit
approval or benign neglect, such [patient care] costs have been reimbursed."28
Currently, insurance companies are inconsistent in covering the clinical care
costs associated with participation in a clinical study.29 One insurer may
approve coverage while another may not; some insurers pay for laboratory
studies but not hospitalization; some pay for outpatient chemotherapy but not
hospitalization related to complications from experimental therapy.30 Greater
cooperation is needed between physicians, insurers and the government to
ensure that patients continue receiving safe and effective medical care today
while supporting technological innovation for the future.31
B. Off-label Drug Use
Off-label drug use is the prescribing of a drug for a purpose or indication
other than that approved by the FDA. Off-label drug use is prevalent in
oncology.32 Over fifty percent of all cancer drugs administered are for off-label
indications.33 A physician may legally prescribe an FDA-approved drug for
uses other than those indicated on the package insert.34 When an
FDA-approved drug is prescribed for new uses, there is no official record of
efficacy of dosage or of the optimum level of benefit to the patient.
35
Consequently, many insurers claim that off-label drug use is experimental and
refuse to reimburse patients for such drugs.36
The controversy over reimbursement of off-label drugs has been addressed
at both the national and state levels. At the national level, President George
27Id.
28 AMA on Scientific Affairs, supra note 18, at 257.
29 Farrar, supra note 14, at 1781.
30 Id.
3 1See Nicholas J. Vogelzang et al., Reimbursement Issues in Clinical Oncology, 15
SEMINARS IN ONcOLOGY 34-43 (Dec. 1988) (health-care specialists present practical
solutions to the dilemma of rising health care costs versus the need for optimal medical
care).
32 Nancy A. Wynstra, Breast Cancer: Selected Legal Issues, 74 CANCER 491, 504 (1994).
33 Kate Nagy, States Aim Laws At Off-Label Reimbursement, 85 J. NAT'L CANCER INST.
701,701 (1993).
34 Wynstra, supra note 32, at 505. A drug manufacturer may, however, file a
supplemental new drug application [hereinafter SNDA] to obtain FDA approval of
different uses for already FDA-approved drugs. Id. Recent studies, however, show that
the application process for a SNDA is approximately the same as for a new drug
application, almost two years. Id. Many manufacturers fail to pursue FDA approval of
new drug uses because of the slowness of the approval process, the cost of new research,
and the possibility of the patent running out before the SNDA process is complete. Id.
35Wynstra, supra note 32, at 505.
36Id.
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Bush appointed a special subcommittee of the National Cancer Advisory
Board, commonly called the Lasagna Committee, to review the off-label drug
reimbursement problem.37 The subcommittee (with the concurrence of the
Health Insurance Association of America) recommended reimbursement of
off-label drugs if the use is listed in any of the following three reference
compendia: the United States Pharmacopeia Drug Information, the American
Medical Association Drug Evaluations, and the American Hospital Formulary
Service Drug Information.3 8 Notwithstanding, many insurers do not appear to
be following the Committee's recommendation.39
The federal government has adopted the Lasagna Committee's
recommended policy on off-label drug reimbursement for Medicaid and
Medicare patients. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 requires
Medicaid agencies to reimburse for off-label use of drugs prescribed if the use
is recognized in any of the standard reference compendia.40 The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 requires coverage under the same criteria for
Medicare patients. 41
Several state legislatures have responded to the reimbursement problem by
mandating reimbursement of off-label drugs when used to treat
life-threatening illnesses, cancer, or HIV/AIDS.42 Only Maryland's statute
mandates coverage for all off-label drug use.43 Most states that have mandated
coverage require reimbursement only if the drug is recognized for treatment
of such indication in one of the standard reference compendia or in the medical
literature. Maryland, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, however, have gone
one step further by providing the establishment of an advisory panel to review
off-label uses of drugs not included in any of the standard reference compendia
371d. at 506.
38jd.
391d.
4OPub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (Nov. 5, 1990).
41Pub. L. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (Aug. 10, 1993).
42 Wynstra, supra note 32, at 506. Ala. Code § 27-1-10.1 (1994) (to treat life-threatening
illnesses); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1367.21 (West 1995) (to treat life-threatening
illnesses); Cal. Ins. Code §§ 10123.195, 11512.182 (West 1995) (to treat life-threatening
illnesses); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 38a-492b, 38a-518b (West 1995) (to treat cancer); Ind.
Code Ann. §§ 27-8-20-7, 27-8-20-9 (West 1995) (to treat cancer); Md. Code Ann. Ins.
§ 490AA (1994) (covers all drugs); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 47K (to treat cancer),
ch. 175 § 47 (to treat HIV/AIDS), ch. 176A, § 8N (to treat cancer), ch. 176A, § 80 (to treat
HIV/AIDS), ch. 176B, § 4N (to treat cancer), ch. 176B, § 4P (to treat HIV/AIDS, ch. 176G,
§ 4E (to treat cancer), ch. 176G, § 4G (to treat HIV/AIDS) (West 1995); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 26:1A-36.9 (West 1995) (to treat life-threatening illnesses); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 63,
§§ 1-2604,1-2605 (West 1995) (to treat cancer/oncology); R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-55-2 (1994)
(to treat cancer).
4 3Md. Code Ann. Ins. § 490AA (1994).
19961
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or in the medical literature and advise whether a particular off-label use is
medically appropriate. 44
IV. HIGH-DOSE CHEMOTHERAPY WITH AUTOLOcOUS BONE MARROW
TRANSPLANTATION
HDCT/ABMT is a procedure by which bone marrow is temporarily
removed from the patient's body, frozen, and stored while the patient receives
near lethal doses of chemotherapy.45 The high-dose chemotherapy kills both
the cancer and the patient's remaining bone marrow.46 After the chemotherapy
is completed, the patient's stored bone marrow is reinfused and quickly
multiplies to replace the marrow destroyed during the high-dose
chemotherapy, thereby "rescuing" the patient.4 7 A patient undergoing
HDCT/ABMT is hospitalized, usually in intensive care, for about ten days and
requires full-time medical attention.48 Most health care institutions providing
HDCT/ABMT require prepayment, preapproval by the patient's insurer, or a
substantial deposit because of the high cost49 of the procedure.50
HDCT/ABMT treatment does not require FDA approval because all of the
drugs used in HDCT/ABMT therapy have been previously approved for use
at lower doses and procedures are not regulated by the FDA.51 HDCT/ABMT
has been used in cancer therapy for two decades and physicians and insurers
consider HDCT/ABMT standard treatment for leukemia and lymphoma. 52
44Md. Code. Ann. Ins. § 490AA (1994); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 47L (West
1995); R1. Gen. Laws § 27-55-3 (1994).
45Wynstra, supra note 32, at 492.
4 6Julia F. Costich, Denial of Coverage for "Experimental" Medical Procedures: The
Problem of DeNovo Review Under ERISA, 79 Ky. LJ. 801, 818 (1991).
4 7Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 664.
4 8 Costich, supra note 46, at 818.
4 9HDCT/ABMT is a one-time procedure with a cost of approximately $150,000. Kim
Anderson, Do You Know What Treatment Your Health Plan Covers?, 10 Bus. & HEALTH 34,
34 (1992). Conventional chemotherapy is an on-going treatment that costs
approximately $12,000 per year. Thomas J. Smith et al., Efficacy and Cost-Effectiveness of
Cancer Treatment: Rational Allocation of Resources Based on Decision Analysis, 85 J. NArL
CANCER INsT. 1460,1468 (1993).
50Doctors, Patients Attack OPM, FEHBP For Failure to Pay For Cancer Treatment, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY (Aug. 23, 1994) available in LEXIS, Bna Library, Bnahcd File;
William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation In Approval By Insurance Companies of
Coverage For Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation For Breast Cancer, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 473,473 (Feb. 17, 1994).
51Hearings Before the House Committee on Post Office & Civil Service, Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employee Benefits, 103d Cong. 140 (1994) (testimony of I. Craig
Henderson, M.D.) available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File.
52Harris Meyer, Breast Study Woes Preview Reform Barriers, 36 AM. MED. NEws 1, 7
(1993).
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Notwithstanding, to date, the medical community has been unable to reach
any consensus on the safety and effectiveness of HDCT/ABMT for the
treatment of breast cancer.
While some physicians claim HDCT/ABMT is the best available treatment
for breast cancer, others claim that HDCT/ABMT may actually be harmful. As
part of testimony at a Congressional hearing regarding OPM's decision to deny
coverage of HDCT/ABMT for certain cancers, the statements of thirty-one
professors of medicine and department chiefs were introduced, each declaring
that HDCT/ABMT has been their treatment of choice for certain breast cancer
patients for the past several years.53 A recent study by ECRI,54 however, found
that HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer may actually
do more harm than good.55 ECRI conducted a careful analysis of all the
available published data and concluded that HDCT/ABMT does not extend
the lives of women with metastatic breast cancer and may actually shorten their
lives.56 ECRI, however, cautioned that its findings are based on a snapshot of
the current state of medical technology and are subject to change as more
studies are completed. 57 ECRI's report did not analyze the effect of
HDCT/ABMT on earlier stage breast cancer.58
V. EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT EXCLUSIONS
Most health insurance policies explicitly exclude coverage for
"experimental" treatments, but many policies fail to define or set standards for
determining what treatments are considered experimental and thus not
covered. 59 The primary reasons insurers use exclusionary provisions are to
53 Hearings Before the House Committee on Post Office & Civil Service, Subcomm. on
Compensation and Employee Benefits, 103d Cong. 140 (1994) (testimony submitted by
Arlene Gilbert Groch, Esq.), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File.
54 ECRI is a non-profit independent technology assessment group which has been in
existence for twenty-six years. Joan Stephenson, Medical Technology Watchdog Plays
Unique Role in Quality Assessment; ECRI, 274 JAMA 999,999 (Oct. 4,1995). ECRI receives
no income from manufacturers of medical devices, carries no advertisements in its
publications, and maintains strict conflict-of-interest rules for its employees. Id.
5 51d.
561d. See Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins., Co., 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994) (patient began
treatment in Jan. 1993 and died in Apr. 1993); Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc.,
823 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (patient underwent treatment from July 25, 1991 to
Sept. 9,1991 and died on Jan. 10, 1992).
57 Stephenson, supra note 54, at 999.
58Ron Winslow, Congressional Rx: How Political Pressure Pushed a U.S. Agency to Back
New Therapy-Health Plans Were Ordered to Pay for Experimental, Costly Cancer
Regimen-Many Scientists Doubt Value, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17,1994, at Al.
59Robert E. Wittes, Payingfor Patient Care in Treatment Research-Who Is Responsible?,
71 CANCER TREAT. REP. 107,107 (1987). See, e.g., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d
1249 (3rd Cir. 1993) (liver transplant); Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653,
655 (8th Cir. 1992) (HDCT/ABMT for malignant melanoma); Jones v. Laborers Health
1996]
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limit their financial liability, keep the cost of insurance down, and encourage
the rendering of safe and effective medical treatments and the elimination of
worthless procedures.60 Unclear exclusionary provisions often result in
litigation.
VI. FAcTORS THAT DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT A TREATMENT IS COVERED
The body of case law addressing coverage disputes involving HDCT/ABMT
for the treatment of breast cancer continues to grow but remains confusing. The
courts addressing this issue have reached different conclusions. The cases are
difficult to harmonize because the decisions are very fact specific. The factors
that determine whether or not a treatment is covered are the patient's medical
insurance policy language and the standard of review.
A. Standard Of Review
The standard of review is important in that it will determine whether a court
will give deference to the fiduciary or agency's decision to deny coverage. The
standard of review depends on what law governs the insurance plan at issue.
Claims regarding an insurer's refusal to cover a treatment it deems
experimental have arisen under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 197461 [hereinafter ERISA], under the Federal Employees Health Benefits
Act62 [hereinafter FEHBA], and under state law.63 Most health insurance plans
& Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.2d 480,481 (9th Cir. 1990) (hyperthermia for breast cancer);
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 856 (1988) (in vitro fertilization); Davis v. Selectcare, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 197,198
(E.D. Mich. 1993) (HDCT/ABMT for prostate cancer); Westover v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1172,1173 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (chelation therapy); Schnitker v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Neb., 787 F. Supp. 903, 904 (D. Neb. 1991) (HDCT/ABMT for
multiple myeloma); Washington v. Winn-Dixie of La., 736 F. Supp. 1418,1419 (E.D. La.
1990) (hyperbaric oxygen for quadriplegia); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 741 F.
Supp. 586, 587 (E.D. Va. 1990) (HDCT/ABMT for breast cancer); Dozsa v. Crum &
Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.NJ. 1989) (ABMT for multiple myeloma);
Stringfield v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 732 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (radial
keratotomy); Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 590, 593 (S.D. Ala. 1988)
(HDCT/ABMT for breast cancer). See generally Annotation, Coverage and Exclusions
Under Hospital or Medical Services (Blue Cross-Blue Shield) Contracts, 81 A.L.R.2d 927
(1994).
6OBarbara A. Fisfis, Who Should Rightfully Decide Whether a Medical Treatment
Necessarily Incurred Should be Excluded From Coverage Under a Health Insurance Policy
Provision Which Excludes From Coverage "Experimental" Medical Treatments?, 31 DuQ. L.
REV. 777,780-81 (1993).
6129 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (West 1994).
625 U.S.C.A. §§ 8901-8913 (West 1995).
63 Wynstra, supra note 32, at 493.
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acquired as a benefit of nongovernmental employment are governed by
ERISA. 64
1. ERISA
The administrative scheme of ERISA requires an insured who has been
denied coverage to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to commencing
suit in federal court.65
A coverage denial of an ERISA benefit claim is generally reviewed under
either an arbitrary and capricious standard or a de novo standard.66 When the
arbitrary and capricious standard is applied, the fiduciary's decision is given
deference; the decision to deny coverage will only be overturned if the court
determines that there was no rational basis for the fiduciary's decision.67
In February, 1989, the United States Supreme Court rejected the arbitrary and
capricious standard in favor of de novo review unless the benefit plan
unambiguously gives the administrator discretionary authority over the
construction of uncertain terms or eligibility determinations.68 The de novo
standard differs from the arbitrary and capricious standard in two significant
ways.69 First, under de novo review the court does not defer to the fiduciary's
decision, but instead determines the interpretation of the policy language that
most accurately represents the intentions of all parties to the agreement.70
Second, in making this determination, the court is not limited to the evidence
available to the fiduciary.71 The court has the option to examine the
circumstances of the dispute and such other admissible evidence. 72 Thus,
under a de novo review a court will closely examine the language of the policy,
the evidence the fiduciary considered in denying coverage, any other
admissible evidence, and the circumstances of the particular dispute. The
establishment of a de novo standard of review for coverage disputes under
ERISA has placed federal district court judges in the difficult position of ruling
64 Costich, supra note 46, at 805.
6529 U.S.C. § 1133(2); Miller v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979,986 (6th Cir.
1991).
6 6Costich, supra note 46, at 811. The Supreme Court rejected the arbitrary and
capricious standard in favor of de novo review in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101,115 (1989).
6 7Wynstra, supra note 32, at 500.
68 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
69 Costich, supra note 46, at 813.
70Id.
7lid.
72Id.
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on the effectiveness of new medical treatments, where those with the medical
expertise have been unable to reach a consensus.73
More recently courts have recognized an interest analysis test when a plan
beneficiary can show that there is a substantial conflict of interest in the
fiduciary's exercise of his discretionary authority to deny benefits.74 Under the
interest analysis standard of review, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to show
that its decision was not a result of self-interest.75
2. FEHB
Federal governmental employees' health benefits are administered by the
Office of Personnel Management [hereinafter OPM], but OPM typically
contracts this responsibility to individual insurance companies.76 An insured
who has been denied coverage under a FEHB insurance plan must exhaust all
administrative appeals at the insurance company level as well as appeal to the
OPM prior to filing a lawsuit.77 The Administrative Procedure Act governs
judicial review of an agency action.78 A court reviewing an OPM decision
applies an arbitrary and capricious standard.79 Unless the court determines
that there is no rational basis for OPM's decision, the court will defer to the
expertise of the agency.80
3. State Law
If a plan does not meet the criteria 81 of an "employee welfare benefit plan"
under ERISA and if the insured is not a state, local, or federal employee, state
law applies. 82
73 See Costich, supra note 46, at 823.
74 Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 US. 1040 (1991).
751d. at 1567.
76 Wynstra, supra note 32, at 503.
771d.
785 U.S.C. A. § 706(2)(A) (West 1995).
791d.
80See, e.g., Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 871 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
81An employer's self-funded health benefit plan will be governed by ERISA if the
following criteria are met: (1) a plan, fund, or program; (2) established or maintained;
(3) by an employer or by an employee organization; (4) for medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability; and (5) to
participants or their beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(1) (West 1994); Wynstra, supra note
32, at 500.
82 Wynstra, supra note 32, at 500.
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While the standard of review is important, some courts applying an arbitrary
and capricious standard have noted that the outcome would be the same under
de novo review.83
B. Policy Language
The most decisive factor in a coverage dispute is the policy language.84 The
policy language determines what treatments are covered, how an insurer
determines whether or not a treatment is excluded because it is "experimental",
the procedures that must be followed in order to obtain coverage, and with an
ERISAclaim, the standard of review a court must apply. If an insurance contract
is unambiguous, the court is bound by its language, but so is the insurer. If an
insurance contract is ambiguous, a court will construe the ambiguities against
the drafter.85 A contract is ambiguous if, after reading the entire contract, its
language may be reasonably understood in different ways.86
There is no consensus definition of experimental treatment. Policies often
define experimental treatment as treatment not commonly and customarily
recognized by the medical community, treatment connected with medical or
other research, or treatment that has no proven medical value. Frequently,
however, policies do not specify the information the insurer will consider in
determining whether the treatment is commonly and customarily recognized
by the medical community, is connected with medical or other research, or has
no proven medical value.
Courts determining whether or not a given treatment is experimental
generally consider the following evidence: (1) expert testimony; (2) a survey
of medical literature; and (3) the language of the consent form. Courts,
however, often give similar evidence different weight.
Cases involving coverage disputes can be divided into three basic categories:
(1) cases where the policy language was unambiguous but the insurer failed to
follow the express terms of the policy in denying coverage; (2) cases where the
policy language was unambiguous and correctly followed; and (3) cases where
the policy language was ambiguous.
83See, e.g., Sweeney v. Gerber Prod. Co., 728 F. Supp. 594, 597 (D. Neb. 1989).
84 Wynstra, supra note 32, at 500.
851d. See Jennifer Belk, Undefined Ezperimenfal Treatment Exclusions in Health Insurance
Contracts: A Proposal for Judicial Response, 66 WASH. L. REV. 809 (1991) (proposing that
courts should construe the term "experimental" narrowly and find treatments
non-experimental if there is any demonstrated likelihood of their success); Fisfis, supra
note 60 at 777 (recommends reforming judiciary review of insurance reimbursement
litigation).
86 Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 864,868 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
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1. Unambiguous Provision Erroneously Applied
In determining coverage, an insurance company is bound by the express
terms of its policy. In Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc.,87 the
policy specified that to be covered the treatment had to be "generally
acknowledged as accepted medical practice by the suitable medical specialty
practicing in Maryland, as decided by us."88 The district court found the phrase
"as decided by us" to be vague and ambiguous.89 Accordingly, the district court
applied a de novo standard of review.
While the district court found the policy's definition of "experimental or
investigative" to be unambiguous, the court concluded that Blue Cross had
disregarded the specific plan language and denied coverage based on its own
independent evaluation of the scientific data, completely ignoring the
consensus of opinion of medical oncologists practicing in Maryland.90 The
district court found expert testimony persuasive that HDCT/ABMT was at the
relevant time being offered at many major medical centers across the country.91
The court also noted that the fact that the proposed treatment was to be given
on research protocol at teaching hospitals did not alter the fact that at the
relevant times Maryland oncologists generally acknowledged the treatment to
be accepted medical practice.92
The insurer in Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc.93 also failed
to adhere to its own policy language in deciding to deny coverage. The policy
stated that the company "will not pay for services ... which are experimental
or investigational in nature; meaning any treatment, procedure. .. drugs, drug
usage ... not recognized as accepted medical practice or not recognized by us
...."94 The company agreed that the phrase "or not accepted by us" was not
meant to suggest an independent evaluation but was intended to articulate
defendant's reservation of authority to decide benefit entitlement.95 The
87 Adams, 757 F. Supp. 661.
881d. at 667.
8 91d. In order for a benefit plan to be entitled to judicial deference with respect to
determining benefits eligibility or construing disputed or ambiguous terms, the plan
language must manifest on its face a clear and unequivocal intent to confer the plan
administrator with discretionary authority. Id. at 666. See, e.g., DeNobel v. Vitro Corp.,
885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989); Graham v. Federal Express Corp., 725 F. Supp. 429,
434 (W.D. Ark. 1989).
90Id.
91Id.
92 Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 663.
93764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991).
941d.
95 Id.
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district court in Bucci, unlike the district court in Adams, agreed with defendant
and reviewed the case under an arbitrary and capricious standard.96
In denying coverage, the company applied a five-factor Technical Evaluation
Criteria [hereinafter TEC].97 The TEC was not incorporated, nor referred to, in
the contract.98 The district court stated that the company's reliance on the TEC
was not valid.99 The district court also found that the insurer's failure to make
reasonable and relevant inquiries when it became aware of new informationlOO
suggested an arbitrary and capricious denial.101
Similarly, in White v. Caterpillar, Inc.,102 the district court also held that the
denial of coverage was arbitrary and capricious because the insurer failed to
follow its own policy language.103 The policy stated that the reports of the
Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project of the American College of Physicians
[hereinafter CEAP] and the Diagnostic and Therapeutic Assessment from the
Council on Scientific Affairs [hereinafter DATA] would be used as a "guide" to
determine whether a surgical procedure is a generally accepted surgical
operation. 104 The district court found that the plan's recognition of these two
reports was not exclusive, but was to be used as a "guide" in determining the
efficacy of a procedure.lOS
Both parties agreed that there was no study by CEAP regarding the efficacy
of HDCT-ABMT.106 Instead of examining the most recent DATA study,
however, the company clung to the results of a study more than five years
old.107 The district court stated that "[wihile the 1990 study should have put
961d. at 731.
971d. TEC is:
(1) governmental regulatory approval; (2) evidence which permits
conclusions as to the effect on patient health; (3) demonstrated improve-
ment of the patient's health; (4) demonstration of medical benefit at
least equal to that offered by established alternative treatment; and(5) improvement other than in investigational settings.
Id.
98764 F. Supp. at 731.
991d.
10 0The new information was that 38 health insurers had committed to the University
of Nebraska, and 32 insurers (mostly the same ones) had committed to Duke University
to cover HDCT/ABMT treatment. Id.
1011d. at 732.
102765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991), affd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991).
103 d. at 1423.
104 M.
105d
106Id. at 1420.
107767 F. Supp. at 1421.
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defendant on notice that the efficacy of treating breast cancer with
HDCT-ABMT was at least debatable and that further examination of the issue
by defendant would therefore be prudent, defendant chose instead to bury its
head in the sand."108 Moreover, further evidence indicated that the company
refused to consider information other than the 1985 DATA study.109 Thus, the
district court found that the defendant's failure to examine other sources and
to exercise independent judgment in determining whether HDCT/ABMT was
generally accepted for the treatment of breast cancer was in contravention of
the method for determining coverage set forth in the policy and was arbitrary
and capricious.110
In Kulakowski v. Rochester Hospital Seruice Corp.,111 the district court also found
that the insurer failed to follow its own exclusionary provision which provided
that it would not provide benefits for any service that was experimental in
nature or not proven to be safe and efficacious. 112 The insurer denied coverage
on the basis of the "experimental" nature of HDCT/ABMT in the treatment of
metastatic breast cancer.113 The company's own expert, however, testified that
the procedure was investigational,114 but not experimental.115 Additionally,
both parties' experts agreed that both conventional chemotherapy and
HDCZ/ABMT are "efficacious" in the treatment of metastatic breast cancer.
116
Furthermore, defendant's expert did not seriously dispute that HDCT/ABMT
is a relatively safe procedure.117 The district court, applying an arbitrary and
capricious standard, found that "a reading of the applicable exclusion denying
108id. at 1421-22.
1091d.
110d.
111779 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. N.Y. 1991).
1121d. at 717. The policy specifically stated:
We will not provide benefits for any procedure or service which,
in the sole judgment of the Blue Choice Medical Director, is experi-
mental in nature. In addition, we will not provide benefits for
medical treatments or procedures not proven to be safe and
efficacious ....
Id. at 712 n.2.
113Id. at 713.
114Generally, the words "experimental" and "investigational" are used
interchangeably. A technology which has been established for the treatment of certain
diseases but remains unproven for another disease is sometimes referred to as
"investigational" as to the new treatment. Testimony of Curtis J. Smith, supra note 51.
115 Kulakowski, 779 F. Supp. at 713.
116Id. at 716.
1171d.
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coverage to a procedure which is not experimental, not unsafe, and not
inefficacious, is clearly arbitrary and cannot be upheld."118
The insurer in Kekis v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc.119
also failed to apply its own definition of experimental treatment in denying
coverage. The policy clearly defined "experimental/investigative services" as
a service or procedure that the company determines "has no proven medical
value."120 Because the policy unambiguously manifested Blue Cross with the
discretion to determine whether a procedure "has no proven medical value, the
district court was required to apply an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review."121
Under the policy language, if Blue Cross determined that a service or
procedure has proven medical value, coverage denial could not legitimately be
based on the experimental/investigative exclusionary clause.122 Blue Cross
did not deny plaintiff's request for coverage on finding that HDCT/ABMT has
no proven medical value; instead, the company denied coverage upon its belief
that the treatment was experimental and investigative in the ordinary sense of
those terms. 123 The district court concluded that Blue Cross erroneously
applied the common, dictionary definition of experimental/investigative,
instead of the definition set forth in the policy.124 The district court held that
Blue Cross acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to review plaintiff's
request for coverage in accordance with the express terms of the contract.125
In Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y), Inc.,126 the insurer failed to
adhere to the terms of its policy relative to precertification procedures. 127 The
plan required preauthorization to be admitted to a hospital or to undergo
elective surgery and stated that Oxford would notify the patient at the time of
118Jd.
119815 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993).
1201d. at 579.
121 1d. at 577.
122Id. at 579.
123Id. at 581.
124Kekis, 815 F. Supp. at 581.
1251d. The court noted, however, that even if Blue Cross had followed the policy terms
and nevertheless decided to exclude coverage, the court still would find the denial to
be arbitrary and capricious. Id.
126823 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
127Id. at 1055. The coverage denial was not based upon an experimental exclusionary
provision, butwasfor failure to obtain precertification, as required by the plan. The plan
did not specifically exclude HDCT/ABMT as a "non-covered expense." Id. In fact,
chemotherapy was listed as a covered expense without qualification as to the dose level.
Id. The policy provided: "Covered Expenses are the following charges... 6. Charges
for the following medical services and supplies: ... b) chemotherapy." 1d. at 1054.
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the call for preauthorization if a second opinion was required.128 The plan
further provided that "[flailure to obtain authorization in advance or failure to
comply with Oxford's medical review guidelines will result in reduced or
denied benefits. "129
The district court, under de novo review, found that Oxford had breached the
terms of the plan.130 The district court found that Oxford breached the
insurance contract in three different ways: first, by not notifying the person
who called for preauthorization that a second opinion was required; second,
by never designating a certified specialist to provide a second opinion, if one
was necessary; and third, even if the recommendation to explore the programs
at Duke and Hahnemann could be viewed as the designation of a board
certified specialist, neither hospital could have complied with the plan
requirements because both had a financial stake in the procedure.
131
Accordingly, the district court concluded that Oxford improperly denied
coverage. 13 2
2. Unambiguous Provision Correctly Applied
A court will uphold a coverage denial where the contract is unambiguous
and the insurer correctly applies the express terms of the contract in denying
coverage. In Sweeney v. Gerber Products Co. Medical Benefits Plan,133 the insurance
company denied coverage of HDCT/ABMT for Ms. Sweeney's metastatic
breast cancer based on the exclusionary provision in the policy which required
the treatment to be widely accepted by the medical community.134 Prior to
denying plaintiff's claim, the insurance company examined the plaintiff's
medical history the specific treatment regimen proposed, and the current state
128 Scalamandre, 823 F. Supp. at 1054. The plan listed 28 separate surgical procedures
that required a second opinion; chemotherapy was not one of them. Id.
12 91d.
13 01d. at 1060.
131Id. at 1060-61.
13 21d. at 1062.
133728 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989).
13 4Id. at 595.
To be 'needed,' a service or supply must be (a) ordered by a doctor,
(b) commonly and customarily recognized throughout the doctor's
profession as appropriate in the treatment or diagnosis of the sickness
or injury, (c) neither educational or [sic] experimental in nature,
(investigational procedures are considered experimental), and
(d) neither furnished mainly for the purpose of medical nor other
research ....
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of medical literature discussing the viability of the treatment.135 The insurer
also obtained opinions of three outside consultants/oncologists. 136
In applying an arbitrary and capricious standard to the 1989 medical
treatment, the district court upheld the insurance company's decision to deny
coverage. 137 The district court noted that the treatment was in phase II clinical
trials and that the consensus in medical literature is that the treatment is
experimental. 138 The district court found particularly significant the fact that
the doctor's consent forms, as well as the protocols, were replete with the terms
"study," "research," "investigation," "experiment," etc., and the fact that different
doctors are experimenting with different protocols. 139 The district court further
noted that even under de novo review, it would still conclude that the plaintiff
is not entitled to benefits for HDCT/ABMT.140
Similarly, in Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 141 the insurance company
denied coverage relying on language which provided that the policy does not
cover anything not reasonably necessary for medical care.142 The policy stated
that to be "reasonably necessary," a treatment must be ordered by a doctor, be
commonly and customarily recognized as appropriate in the treatment of the
diagnosed illness, and neither educational nor experimental.143 The district
court reviewed this case under a de novo standard and held that the treatment
was experimental in nature and had not yet been commonly and customarily
recognized throughout the medical profession. 144 The district court relied on
the signed consent form145 which noted that the procedure was an
"experimental study."146
135Id. at 596.
1361d.
137728 F. Supp. at 597.
1381d.
1391d. at 596. It should be noted that Sweeney involved treatment to be rendered in
1989, and it is quite possible that a court now would rule differently given that the
procedure is more widely accepted by the medical community. Wynstra, supra note 32,
at 503.
140Sweeney, 728 F. Supp. at 597.
141951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1992).
142Id. at 90.
143Id. See also Wynstra, supra note 32, at 496.
144951 F.2d at 89; see also Wynstra, supra note 32, at 496.
145The consent form provided:
2. PURPOSE OF STUDY: This is an experimental study which uses
high doses of mitoxantrone, etoposide (VP-16) and thiotepa (MVT)
in the treatment, combined with bone marrow transplantation.
The use of higher-than-normal doses of chemotherapy carries with
it a greater risk of complications to both the blood-forming cells of
the body (the marrow) and other organs. Therefore, the purposes of
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The Fifth Circuit in affirming the district court's finding that as of the time
(late 1987) when the plaintiff underwent HDCT/ABMT found the treatment
to be experimental and stated that the trial court was in the best position to
view the evidence and weigh the testimony of the expert witnesses.147 The Fifth
Circuit noted, however, that had the plaintiff undergone a similar treatment
more recently under an accepted protocol, this case may have turned out
differently.148
In Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co.,149 the insurance company refused Ms.
Fuja's preapproval request because the treatment did not fall within the
parameters of medically necessary procedures, as defined in the policy.150 The
insurance company argued that the treatment was provided in connection with
medical research and was not authorized for reimbursement by the Health Care
Financing Administration.15 1 The insurance company appealed a district court
decision enjoining it from denying coverage.15 2 The Seventh Circuit, applying
a de novo standard of review, reversed the district court's judgment.15 3
The Seventh Circuit found that the phrase "in connection with medical
research" was unambiguous and that the evidence clearly established that
the disputed treatment was provided "in connection with medical or other
this study are: 1) to find if such a combination is associated with
acceptable toxicity to organs other than the bone marrow when
used with the infusion of autologous marrow; and 2) to determine
if, at these high doses, there is a significant response rate [shrinkage
of the tumor].
Holder, 951 F.2d at 90.
1461d.
1471d. at 91.
1481d. See White v. Caterpiller, Inc. 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991), affid, 985 F.2d
564 (8th Cir. 1991); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 728 (D.
Conn. 1991); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md.
1991).
14918 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
1501d. The policy defined medically necessary as:
required and appropriate for care of the Sickness or the Injury; and
that are given in accordance with generally accepted principles of
medical practice in the US. at the time furnished; and that are
approved for reimbursement by the Health Care Financing Admini-
stration; and that are not deemed to be experimental, educational or
investigational in nature by any appropriate technological assess-
ment body established by any state or federal government; and
that are not furnished in connection with medical or other research.
Id. at 1408.
151d. at 1407.
152d. at 1406.
1531d. at 1412.
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research."154 The Seventh Circuit found most significant the testimony of
plaintiff's own expert, who testified that the plaintiff was informed that her
treatment would be furnished in connection with medical research as part of a
clinical trial.155 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit relied on the signed consent
form labeled: "Consent by Subject for Participation in Research Protocol"
which repeatedly stated that the subject was part of a "research project,"
"research study" or "research protocol."156
The best way for an insurer to protect itself from litigation and unfavorable
court decisions in those cases which go to court is to list specifically the
procedures which are not covered and the evidence that will be considered in
determining whether or not a treatment is experimental and to follow such
policy language in determining coverage. In Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit
Plan,157 the Eighth Circuit upheld OPM's denial of coverage because the policy
unambiguously limited coverage of autologous bone marrow transplants to
certain diseases, and breast cancer was not one of them.
The exclusionary provision in Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Co. & Rural Benefit
Plan158 specified three forms of evidence which would be considered in
determining whether a treatment was investigational or experimental. 159 The
Seventh Circuit in upholding OPM's coverage denial found that all three forms
of reliable evidence supported the view that HDCT/ABMT is experimental. 160
3. Ambiguous Provision
When an insurance policy fails to define "experimental" treatment, a court
will make the determination. In Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 161 the
insurance company denied coverage relying on a provision in its policy which
154 Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1410.
1SSId.
15 61d. at 1411.
157995 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1993).
158992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993). The policy stated: 'Benefits are not provided for
services and supplies... [tihat are investigational or experimental or are mainly for
research purposes." Id. at 708.
159The policy provided that:
A drug, device or medical treatment or procedure is experimental
or investigational: ... (2) if Reliable Evidence shows that the drug,
device or medical treatment or procedure is the subject of on-going
phase , 11, or III clinical trials or under study to determine its maxi-
mum tolerated dose, its toxicity, its safety, its efficacy, or its efficacy
as compared with the standard means of treatment ....
Id. Coverage also may be denied "if Reliable Evidence shows that the consensus of
opinion among experts regarding the drug, device or medical treatment or procedure
is that further studies or clinical trials are necessary ... " Id.
1 60 d. at 712-13.
161741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
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excluded all "experimental or clinical investigative procedures; services of no
scientifically proven medical value; also services not in accordance with
generally accepted standards of medical practice."162 The policy nowhere
defined an "experimental or clinical investigative" procedure.163
The district court reviewed the case under a de novo standard and, after
examining the expert testimony adduced at trial, concluded that
HDCF/ABMT is not experimental. 164 Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Holder, the
district court in Pirozzi concluded that the use of a protocol or continued studies
is neither determinative nor ultimately persuasive of the treatment's status as
an experimental procedure. 165 The district court found particularly persuasive
the testimony of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Beveridge, who stated that
HDCT/ABMT treatment is currently in use at most major medical centers. 166
Dr. Beveridge further supported his position that HDCT/ABMT is safe and
effective for the treatment of metastatic breast cancer by describing studies
conducted at John Hopkins University, the University of Chicago, and Duke
University.167
The district court noted that the decision is narrowly anchored in the specific
expert testimony and in the terms and structure of the plan's experimental
exclusionary provision.168 The district court further stated that "a different
experimental exclusion, or different expert testimony, or a plan that conferred
broad discretion on the administrator might well require a different result."169
In Tepe v. Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Medical Serv.,170 the Colorado Court of
Appeals found that a benefit change under the policy which was not properly
communicated to the insureds created an ambiguity. After the insurer's
coverage denial was affirmed at every level of the appeal process, the Tepes
brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.171 The trial court, apply-
1621d. at 588.
163Id.
164 d. at 594.
165741 F. Supp. at 594.
166 d. at 591.
1671d. at 592. A 24-patient Johns Hopkins University HDCT/ABMT study
demonstrated a 67% survival rate at 17 months;a 49-patientUniversity of Chicago study
demonstrated a median survival rate of 20 months and a 20 percent survivorship rate
at three years; a 1989 Duke University study demonstrated a positive response rate of
80% (as of Mar. 13, 1990, only five of the 54 patients treated had relapsed). Id.
1681d. at 594.
169741 F. Supp. at 594.
170893 P.2d 1323 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
17 11d. at 1325.
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ing Colorado law, granted summary judgment in favor of the Tepes, and the
insurer appealed.172
Plaintiffs were subscribers to the 1990 Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan which
provided coverage for bone marrow transplants and chemotherapy
procedures. 173 The 1990 plan excluded coverage for "services and supplies...
which are investigative, mainly for research purposes or experimental in
nature."174 Defendant claims that coverage for HDCT/ABMT was excluded
under this experimental exclusion. 175
In 1991, the plan was changed to provide coverage for bone marrow
transplants only for specifically listed diseases, which did not include breast
cancer.176 Both the 1991 and 1992 plan brochures, however, failed to list this
change in coverage as a benefit change. 177 In 1993, the plan language was
changed to specifically exclude coverage for HDCT/ABMT for the treatment
of breast cancer.178 Once again, the plan brochure failed to identify this change
in coverage. 179
The trial court found that the insurer had not given plaintiffs adequate notice
of the change in benefits. 180 Accordingly, the trial court found the 1993 plan to
be ambiguous with respect to HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer,
notwithstanding the specific exclusionary language.181 The Court of Appeals
affirmed.182
In the state action of Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan,183 the
Michigan Court of Appeals found ambiguous a provision which excluded
coverage for services which are experimental or research in nature, without
further defining these terms.184 The trial court found that the terms
1721d.
1731d.
174Id. at 1328.
175 Tepe, 893 P.2d at 1328.
176Id.
1771d. Each plan brochure advised the insured to read the entire plan but reassured
the insured that: 'Unless indicated above as a benefit change, the brochure revisions do
not affect the benefits available under this Plan." Id. at 1329.
178Id. at 1328.
179Tepe, 893 P.2d at 1329.
1801d.
18 11d.
182Id.
183517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
184 Id. at 867. The provision specifically stated: "The following services are not covered
by this contract: Benefits for care, services, supplies or devices which are experimental
or research in nature." Id.
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1996
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
"experimental" and "research in nature" were ambiguous. 185 In holding that
HDCT/ABMT was not experimental or research in nature, the trial court found
most persuasive the expert testimony of Ms. Taylor's treating oncologists.186
The doctors testified that HDCT/ABMT was Ms. Taylor's only chance to be
free of cancer for at least two or three years.187 The doctors further testified that
Ms. Taylor's life expectancy would be only a matter of months with
conventional chemotherapy.188 Although the trial court acknowledged that
research was the underlying purpose of the procedure, it found that the
primary purpose of the procedure was to provide Ms. Taylor her only
opportunity to be free of cancer for a substantial period of time.189
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals found
unpersuasive the fact that HDCT/ABMT procedures are conducted only at
research institutions and that the procedures would be conducted under a
protocol and the information gathered regarding Ms. Taylor's procedure
would be shared with other researchers.190 The Court of Appeals noted that
the insurer could have inserted these factors in defining "experimental" or
"research in nature" in the policy, but failed to do so.191
The legal system is a very costly and inefficient mechanism for judging the
current state of medical technology. Coverage disputes are decided on a
case-by-case basis. Each decision is confined to the specific policy language,
the specific expert testimony, and the state of medical technology at the time
of the coverage denial. Slightly different policy language, different experts,192
normal advances in medical knowledge, or treatment to be given a short time
later may likely result in a different outcome. Therefore, court decisions have
no precedential value. Accordingly, coverage disputes involving similar policy
language and similar treatments are forced into litigation over and over again,
tying up the courts and adding to the cost of health care.
VII. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A growing number of insurance companies have fortified their legal
defenses by changing policy language from generally excluding
"experimental" treatment to specifically excluding designated treatments for
185Id. at 868.
1861d. at 869.
187517 N.W.2d at 869.
188 1d.
18 91d.
190 1d.
19 11d.
192 Because expert testimony is so crucial to a determination of the efficacy of the
disputed treatment and because of the apparent conflict-of-interest of each party's
expert, courts should employ independent medical experts.
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certain diseases, particularly HDCT/ABMT for breast cancer.193 This tactic,
however, has left insurers vulnerable to lawsuits alleging discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964194 [hereinafter Title VII] and the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990195 [hereinafter the ADA].196 The flaw
in the lawsuits alleging discrimination is that the claimants assume that
HDCT/ABMT has equal medical value across all types and stages of cancer,
which is contrary to medical science. 197
In Reger v. Espy,198 the plaintiff alleged that the exclusion of HDCT/ABMT
treatment for breast cancer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in
that the exclusion has a disparate impact upon women.199 The plan did not
cover HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of all but five specified types of
cancer.200 The district court found that the plaintiff failed to establish that the
facially neutral exclusion had a disparate impact on women.201
193 Meyer, supra note 52, at 8.
19442 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1994).
19542 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1994). The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating
on the basis of disability against a qualified individual with a disability in regard to
fringe benefits, including health insurance plans, available by virtue of employment. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4(o (1995). If the EEOC determines that the
challenged term or provision is disability-based, the EEOC will conclude that the
respondenthas violated the ADA unless itcanprove that thedisability-based distinction
is within the protective ambit of section 501(c) of the ADA. EEOC Interim Guidance on
Application ofADA to Health Insurance, 109 BNA DAILY LAB. REP. E-1, E-1 (June 9,1993).
A disability-based distinction is within the protective ambitof section 501(c) of the ADA
if the respondent can prove that:
1) the health insurance plan is either a bona fide insured health insurance
plan that is not inconsistent with state law, or a bona fide self-insured
health insurance plan; and 2) the challenged disability-based distinction
is not being used as a subterfuge.
Id. atE-2. The respondent can prove that a challenged disability-based distinction is not
a subterfuge by proving that- (a) it has not engaged in the alleged disability-based
disparate treatment; (b) the disparate treatment is justified by legitimate actuarial data,
or by actual or reasonably anticipated experience, and that illnesses with comparable
actuarial data and/or experience are treated in the same manner; (c) the disparate
treatment is necessary to ensure the fiscal soundness of the plan; (d) the challenged
practice is necessary to prevent a drastic increase in premium payments or a drastic
alteration in the scope of coverage provided; or (e) where the charging party is challenging
the respondent's denial of coveragefor a disability-specific treatment, the respondent may prove
that the disputed treatment has no medical value. (emphasis added) Id. at E-3.
196Woolsey, supra note 9, at 2. An Omaha, Nebraska, defense lawyer stated that,
"During the last year, 80% of the cases in my office have also contained the charge that
the exclusion in the coverage contract violates some anti-discrimination law." Id. at 26.
19 7Christine Woolsey, Denial or Discrimination?; Patients Turn to ADA to Receive
Controversial Treatments, Bus. INs., June 26,1995, at 35.
198836 F. Supp. 869 (D.C. Ga. 1993).
1991d. at 870.
2001d. at 871.
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In Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc.,202 the plaintiff brought her claim
under the ADA. The district court denied a preliminary injunction because the
plan, like the plan in Reger, explicitly excluded HDCT/ABMT for most
cancers.20 3 The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for entry of a
preliminary injunction requiring Bodine to pay for the treatment and ordering
the matter to be set for trial.204 The court stated that "if the evidence shows that
a given treatment is non-experimental... and the plan provides the treatment
for other conditions directly comparable to the one at issue, the denial of
treatment violates the ADA."205
VI. OPM AND STATE LEGISLATURES TAKE ACTION
On September 20, 1994, in spite of the Office of Personnel Management's
recognition that there is no consensus on the treatment's efficacy, OPM issued
a directive effective immediately requiring the 350 health plans serving the nine
million federal employees and their dependents to cover HDCT/ABMT for
breast cancer, multiple myeolma, and epithelial ovarian cancer in randomized
and non-randomized clinical trials.206 OPM's decision is expected to cost
approximately $120 million a year.20 7
State legislatures have reacted in different ways. 208 Massachusetts 20 9 and
New Hampshire2 10 have responded to the growing number of coverage
disputes involving HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer by
mandating coverage. Both states require that the procedure be performed
pursuant to protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer
Institute.2 11 Neither state explicitly requires that the patient be part of a clinical
trial to receive reimbursement.212 Additionally, both states provide that this
2011d. at 873.
20279 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1995).
2031d. at 960.
2041d. at 959-60.
2051d. at 960.
206Winslow, supra note 58, at Al.
2 0 7 1d.
208Under ERISA's "savings clause," state law which regulates insurance is exempt
from ERISA preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
2 09MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32A, § 17A; ch. 175, § 47M; ch. 176A, § 80; ch. 176B, § 40;
ch. 176G, § 4F (West 1994) (only mandates coverage where the breast cancer has
progressed to metastatic disease).
210N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-c, 419:5-c, 420:5-d, 420-A:7-e, 420-B:8-e (1993).
211See notes 209-10.
2 21d.
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procedure shall not be subject to any greater deductible or copayment than that
applicable to any other coverage.213
Minnesota recently enacted legislation mandating coverage of
HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer.214 Minnesota's law also
prohibits any greater coinsurance, copayment or deductible than that
applicable to any other coverage under the plan.215 Minnesota's law does not
require that treatment be provided as part of a clinical trial or even in
accordance with an approved protocol. Bills are pending in Colorado,216 New
Jersey,217 New York,218 and Ohio219 which mandate coverage for the treatment
of cancer by bone marrow transplants when performed pursuant to approved
protocols.
Virginia has passed, but has delayed the effective date of, legislation which
requires health care plans for state employees to provide coverage of
HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer when performed as part of a
clinical trial sponsored by the NCI.220 Relative to other plans, Virginia, like
Missouri, has taken an optional coverage approach. Virginia and Missouri have
213 d. However, a Virginia statute provides that a deductible for such coverage in an
amount different than that applicable to any other coverage may also be offered. VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1994).
2141995 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. 183 (H.F. 1742) (West).
2151d.
2 16 Colorado has indefinitely postponed Colorado Senate Bill No. 67 which would
require health insurers to cover the physician fees and hospital costs, but not
research-related costs, whenever an insured, who has been referred by a primary care
physician, participates in approved cancer treatment clinical trials.
217 New Jersey Assembly Bill 1997 and Senate Bill 1320 mandate coverage for the
treatmentof cancer byHDCT/ABMT or stem cell transplants whenperformed pursuant
to approved protocols, but do not differentiate by type of cancer. New Jersey Assembly
Bill 175, however, is more explicit requiring health insurers to provide benefits for
expenses incurred in connection with bone marrow transplants and peripheral blood
stem cell transplants for the treatment of patients suffering from diseases including, but
not limited to, leukemia, aplastic anemia and breast cancer. New Jersey Assembly Bill
175 further provides that coverage shall not be denied on the basis that bone marrow
transplants or peripheral blood stem cell transplants are experimental or investigational.
218New York Assembly Bill 11533 requires coverage for bone marrow transplants for
persons who have been diagnosed with breast cancer, provided, however, that said
person meets the criteria established by the Department of Health, which criteria shall
be consistent with protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute.
New York Assembly Bill 4260 and New York Senate Bill 2662 require health insurance
policies to cover all medically necessary expenses incurred in connection with bone
marrow transplants, but do not specify for what types of diseases bone marrow
transplants are appropriate or who determined what is medically necessary.
2 19 0hio House Bills 554 and 592 require certain health insurers to provide benefits
for the expenses arising from the treatment of breast cancer by ABMT according to
approved protocols.
22 0VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-20.1 (Michie 1995).
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enacted legislation which requires health insurers to offer a supplemental
benefit rider to cover the expenses associated with the treatment of breast
cancer by HDCT/ABMT or stem cell transplants when performed pursuant to
approved protocols.22 1 Virginia and Missouri's laws, like Massachusetts' and
New Hampshire's, do not require that the treatment be provided as part of a
clinical trial and do not delineate by the stage of the breast cancer.
Florida has taken a technology assessment approach similar to that
recommended by Judge Coffey in Fuja.222 Chapter 627.4236 of Florida Statutes
dictates that a health insurer may not exclude coverage for bone marrow
transplantation procedures recommended by a physician under a policy
exclusion for experimental procedures, if the procedure is determined to be
accepted within the appropriate oncological specialty and not experimental
under the rules adopted by the Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative
Services. 223
22 1 VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1994) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Each insurer... shall offer and make available coverage under such
policy, contract or plan.. . for the treatment of breast cancer by dose-
intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem
cell transplants when performed pursuant to protocols approved by
the institutional review board of any United States medical teaching
college including, but not limited to, National Cancer Institute protocols
that have been favorably reviewed and utilized by hematologists or
oncologists experienced in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous
bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants.
1995 Mo. LEGIS. SERv. S.B. 27 (Vernon) provides in pertinent part:
376.1200.1. Each entity offering individual and group health insurance
policies... shall offer coverage for the treatment of breast cancer by dose-
intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem
cell transplants when performed pursuant to nationally accepted peer
review protocols utilized by breast cancer treatment centers experienced
in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants
or stem cell transplants.
222 1n Fuja, Judge Coffey suggested the establishment of regional cooperative
committees comprised of oncologists, internists, surgeons, experts in medical ethics,
medical school administrators, economists, representatives of the insurance industry,
patient advocates and politicians to reach some consensus on the definition of
experimental procedures and an agreement on the procedures which are so cost
prohibitive that requiring insurers to cover them might result in the collapse of the health
care industry. 18 F.3d at 1412.
223 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4236 (West 1995) further specifies that the rules must be
based upon recommendations of an advisory panel composed of: (1) one adult
oncologist, selected from a list of three names recommended by the Florida Medical
Association; (2) one pediatric oncologist, selected from a list of three names
recommended by the Florida Pediatric Society; (3) one representative of the J. Hillis
Miller Health Center at the University of Florida; (4) one representative of the H. Lee
Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, Inc.; (5) one consumer representative,
selected from a list of three names recommended by the Insurance Commissioner; (6)
one representative of the Health Insurance Association of America; (7) two
representatives of health insurers, one of whom represents the insurer with the largest
Florida health insurance premium volume and one of whom represents the insurer with
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Finally, California takes a less intrusive approach to dealing with the
reimbursement controversy. California Assembly Bill 3654 does not mandate
coverage for bone marrow transplants, but requires that information be
provided to prospective enrollees of any health care plan regarding whether,
and to what extent, the plan provides coverage for experimental transplant
treatment for breast cancer patients.
IX. DANGERS OF POLITICIZING MEDICINE
Politicizing medicine jeopardizes patient safety and medical innovation.
Mandatory coverage of an unproven treatment will result in wide spread
acceptance and dissemination of that treatment before its true safety and
effectiveness is determined. Mandatory coverage will likely lower
participation in clinical trials, thereby making a determination of the
treatment's true efficacy impossible. Mandatory coverage of an unproven
treatment may delay the discovery of a more effective treatment because
researchers may shift their focus to another disease. There is a danger that the
unproven treatment may actually do more harm than good, as is suggested by
ECRI's recent study. Legislation which addresses one disease at a time is a
piecemeal approach to a very serious problem.
X. RECOMMENDATIONS
While mandatory coverage of HDCT/ABMT for the treatment of breast
cancer solves the coverage dispute dilemma as it relates to that particular
treatment for that particular disease, it does little to resolve the problem of
courts judging new medical technologies and leaves the question of who
should pay for the patient care costs of clinical research unanswered. Federal
legislation is needed which sets out a clear definition of"experimental" medical
treatment, has a uniform policy on off-label drug reimbursement, and
mandates that insurers cover the clinical care costs associated with
participation in approved clinical cancer trials.
A. Recommended Definition Of "Experimental" Medical Treatment
I recommend the following definition for "experimental" medical
treatment 2
24
A drug, device or medical treatment or procedure is experimental:
(1) If Reliable Evidence shows that the drug, device or medical
treatment or procedure is the subject of on-going phase I, H
or III clinical trials or under study to determine its maximum
tolerated dose, its toxicity, its safety, its efficacy, or its efficacy
the second largestFlorida health insurance premium volume; and (8) one representative
of the insurer with the largest Florida small group health insurance premium volume.
224This definition is almost identical to the policy definition in Harris v. Mutual of
Omaha, 992 F.2d at 708.
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as compared with the standard means of treatment or
diagnosis; or
(2) If Reliable Evidence shows that the consensus of opinion
among experts regarding the drug, device or medical
treatment or procedure is that further studies or clinical
trials are necessary to determine its maximum tolerated
dose, its toxicity, its safety, its efficacy, or its efficacy as
compared with the standard means of treatment or
diagnosis.
Reliable Evidence means published reports and articles in the
authoritative medical and scientific literature; the written protocol or
protocols used by the treating facility or the protocol(s) of another
facility studying substantially the same drug, device or medical
treatment; or the written informed consent used by the treating facility
or by another facility studying substantially the same drug, device or
medical treatment or procedure.
B. Recommended Off-label Drug Legislation
I recommend the following language for federal legislation establishing a
uniform policy for reimbursement of off-label drug use. Because off-label drug
use is so prevalent, reimbursement of off-label drug use should not be limited
to drugs used to treat life-threatening illness.
(a) No health insurer issuing a policy which provides coverage
for prescription drugs shall exclude coverage of any such
drug on the grounds that the drug has not been approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for that
indication in one of the standard reference compendia, or in
the medical literature.
(b) Standard reference compendia means (1) the United States
Pharmacopeia Drug Information, (2) the American Medical
Association Drug Evaluations, and (3) the American
Hospital Formulary Service Drug Information.
(c) Medical literature means published scientific studies of
off-label use of drugs appearing in any peer-reviewed
national professional journal.
(d) Any coverage for the off-label use of a prescription drug
required by this section shall also include provisions for
coverage of medically necessary services associated with the
administration of the prescription drug.
(e) No coverage shall be required for any drug not licensed or
approved by the FDA, for the use of any drug when the FDA
has determined that its use is contraindicated, or any
experimental drug not otherwise approved by the FDA.
C. Recommended Legislation Relative To Clinical Trials
Mandatory coverage of patient care costs associated with approved clinical
cancer trials will result in quicker patient accruals and quicker answers relative
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to whether a new treatment is more effective than the standard therapy and
under what circumstances the new treatment is more beneficial. Mandatory
coverage of patient care costs associated with approved clinical cancer trials
will alleviate the constant relitigation of the efficacy of a given medical
treatment because more patients, assured of coverage associated with an
approved clinical trial, will opt for enrollment in a clinical trial instead of a
costly and uncertain lawsuit. I propose the following language:225
Each insurer, health maintenance organization, profit and
non-profit health/hospital service corporation, or similar corporation
shall cover patient care costs whenever an insured, enrollee or
subscriber participates, after referral by a primary care physician, in a
Phase III approved dinical cancer trial.
"Patient care costs" means physician fees and hospital expenses, but
does not include research-related costs.
Patient care costs for dinical trials shall be reimbursed when all of
the following requirements are met:
The treatment is provided with a therapeutic intent and is being
provided pursuant to a clinical trial that has been approved by
any of the following: The National Cancer Institute or any of its
clinical cancer centers, cooperative groups, or community clinical
oncology programs; the United States Food and Drug
Administration in the form of an Investigational New Drug in
conjunction with a clinical trial approved by the National Cancer
Institute; or the United States Department of Veteran Affairs, for
clinical trials which are part of a National Cancer
Center-approved clinical cancer center program.
D. Technology Assessment Partnerships Recommended
In addition, because health care resources are limited and many new medical
technologies are, at least initially, more expensive than current therapies,
technology assessment is needed to determine whether a new treatment is
superior to the current treatment.226
In response to increased litigation, technology assessment partnerships
between private payers and government have already begun to emerge. In
1991, Blue Cross & Blue Shield entered into an agreement with the National
Cancer Institute whereby Blue Cross & Blue Shield would fund a large
demonstration project testing the efficacy of HDCT/ABMT treatment for ad-
225Colorado has proposed similar legislation, but a vote on the legislation has been
postponed indefinitely. See 1994 Co. S.B. 67.
2 26See Cori Vanchieri, Treatment Costs Warrant Closer Look in Clinical Trials, 84 J. NAT'L
CANCER INST. 918 (1992) (discussing cost assessment as part of clinical trials).
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vanced breast cancer.227 In 1992, Congress gave the Agency for Health Care
Policy and Research the power to form "technology partnerships" with private
sector payers and others.228
XI. CONCLUSION
I urge legislators to refrain from politicizing medical technology and
abandoning our system of clinical trials. While I recognize that a vote against
mandatory coverage of a potentially life-saving treatment for a highly
publicized disease may seem like political suicide, government has a duty to
protect the public against potentially unsafe and ineffective medical
treatments. Coverage of "experimental" medical treatment can be better
addressed by federal legislation which sets out a clear definition of
"experimental" medical treatment and a uniform policy on off-label drug
reimbursement, and mandates reimbursement of clinical care costs associated
with participation in approved clinical cancer trials.
MELODY L. HARNESS
22 9
22 7ACHPR May Form Technology Assessment Partnerships With Private Sector Payers,
BNA MGMT. BRIEFING (Jan. 14, 1993) available in LEXIS, Bna LIBRARY Bnamb FILE
[hereinafter BNA Mgrat.j.
22 8pub. L. No. 102-410 (1992). See BNA MGmT., supra note 227.
229The author wishes to thank Steven R. Smith, former Dean of Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law, for his valuable contributions to this Note.
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